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Abstract
The English education system has undergone large-scale restructuring through
the introduction of academy schools. Themost salient feature of these schools is
that, despite remaining part of the state sector, they operatewithmore autonomy
than the predecessors they replaced. Two distinct periods of academy school
introduction have taken place, under the auspices of different governments. The
first batch was initiated in the 2002–03 school year by the Labour government
of the time, and was a school improvement programme directly aimed at
turning around badly performing schools. The second batch involved a mass
academisation process following the change of government in May 2010 and
the Academies Act of that year, which resulted in increased heterogeneity of
new academies. This paper compares the two batches of introduction with
the aim of getting a better understanding of their similarities and differences,
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and their importance for education policy. To do so, we study what types of
schools were more likely to change to academy status in the two programmes,
and the impact of this change on the quality of new pupil enrolments into
the new types of school. Whilst we do point out some similarities, these are
the exception rather than the norm. For the most part, our analysis reveals a
number of marked dissimilarities between the two programmes, in terms of
both the characteristics of schools that became academies and the changes in
pupil intakes that occurred post-conversion.
Policy points
 Over the past two decades, academies have become central to secondary
education in the state sector in England. Despite remaining part of the
state sector, academies are able to operate with more autonomy than the
predecessor schools they replaced.
 Initially introduced by the Labour government in 2002 as part of a targeted
school improvement programme, academies have become part of a ‘big
push’ for autonomy in state education promoted by the government since
2010.
 We compare the characteristics of schools converting during the two
batches of academy introduction – i.e. before and after 2010 – and the
characteristics of pupils enrolling in the two types of academies following
conversion.
 We find the two programmes to be very different, in terms of both the
characteristics of schools that became academies and the changes in pupil
intake that occurred post-conversion.
 This means that – despite a widespread tendency to do so – it is not possible
to extrapolate the lessons learnt from the first batch of academies to the
second one.
I. Introduction
A feature of the evolving nature of education systems in a number of countries
has been the introduction of school reforms operating through the creation of
new school types. The best-known recent examples of these are free schools
(friskolor) in Sweden, charter schools in the United States and academy
schools in England. These new school types have mostly been introduced
from a premise that the pre-existing education system was not delivering high
enough standards for children. Whilst there are notable differences between
them (in particular, whether they are brand-new schools or conversions from
existing schools), they all represent movements away from what can be
thought of as the traditional, state-controlled, local or community school.
More specifically, these new schools are typically decentralised from local
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authority /municipality / school district control, and thus havemore operational
autonomy.
This paper focuses on the academy schools of England. The introduction
of academies, which began in the early 2000s, is turning out to be one of
the most radical and encompassing programmes of school reform seen in the
recent past amongst advanced countries. Unlike traditional community schools,
academies are autonomous, state-funded schools which are managed and run
outside the local authority’s control. In almost all cases, they are conversions of
existing predecessor schools that inherit pupils already enrolled in the school.
In essence, academies are school ‘takeovers’ which, because of their nature,
enable schools to operate with considerably more autonomy and strategic
independence than they did in their predecessor state.1
At present, around 2,100 of England’s secondary schools (or about 65 per
cent of them) and a further 3,400 primary schools (about 23 per cent) have
become academies.2 Whilst the first academies were introduced in the 2002–03
school year by the Labour government in power at the time, the vast majority
became academies after the change of government in May 2010. The newly
elected Conservative–Liberal-Democrat coalition quickly ushered in the 2010
Academies Act, a legislative change that widened the academies’ remit. Prior
to the Act, only secondary schools could become academies, and in order to
convert they were required to sign up a sponsor. After the Academies Act, there
was more heterogeneity, as primaries were also allowed to become academies,
and a sponsor was no longer required for conversion to take place.
In fact, the introduction of the Act dramatically changed the aim of the
programme.While the Labour government introduced academies as a remedial
programme aimed at replacing failing schools, the coalition government
expanded the programme as part of a project aimed at introducing greater
autonomy and competition into the state school sector. While new Labour-
type ‘sponsored’ academies have continued to open, most of the expansion
of the academy sector has come from ‘converter’ academies: high-performing
schools that change their institutional arrangements to acquire greater freedom
in terms of budgeting, hiring of staff, pay and working condition negotiations,
performance management, taught curriculum and length of the school day. To
put things in perspective, ‘converters’ represent more than 80 per cent of the
expansion of the academy sector in the past six years.
1They are different from most US charter schools, which are typically set up from scratch. A closer
comparison to the typical charter school in England is the free schools, a recent addition to the education
landscape. These are new schools often set up by parent or community groups. Conversely, the closer US
comparison to English academies would be ‘in-district’ charters, where an already existing public school
is converted to a charter as a school takeover. Although these are less commonplace than the other US
charters, there are places where conversions of public schools to charters have taken place (such as Boston
and New Orleans – see Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016)).
2In England, secondary schooling takes place from ages 11–12 to 15–16 (Years 7 to 11) and primary
schooling from ages 4–5 to 10–11 (Years 1 to 6).
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Since May 2010, there have been further developments in the scale and
scope of the academy programme. In March 2016, the new Conservative
government announced that all schools would have to become, or be in the
process of becoming, academies by 2022.However, following strong resistance
from parents, teachers’ associations and local councils – as well as some
politicians – the plan was officially abandoned in October 2016. Nevertheless,
it is still the case that the government aspires to have as many schools as
possible voluntarily gaining academy status, although the model seems to have
fallen somewhat down the current education policy agenda and has become
one of ‘encouragement’ rather than ‘compulsion’. Notwithstanding these
recent developments, the stark differences in the purposes of the academies
programme before and after May 2010 have remained.
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast these two (pre- and
post-May-2010) programmes. One reason why this investigation is needed is
the continued extrapolation of findings from the first programme to the post-
May-2010 conversions, by policymakers, media commentators and – in some
cases – academics. The extent to which this extrapolation is valid depends on
the extent to which the two programmes – and, more precisely, the schools
becoming academies before/after May 2010 – are alike.
To uncover what similarities and differences characterise the two regimes,
we undertake an empirical study of academy conversions that took place
between the academic years 2002–03 and 2012–13, with two particular
research questions in mind. First, we study the characteristics of secondary
schools that gain academy status. It is well documented that the pre-2010
conversionswere underachieving schools usually serving disadvantaged inner-
city neighbourhoods. A general perception, as well as the nature of the coalition
government’s academy programme, suggests that this is not true for the new
batch of academies. In this paper, we present rigorous empirical evidence on
the validity or otherwise of this perception.3
The second focus is on how academy conversion impacts on a school’s
pupil intake and to what extent this differs between the two regimes.
Early evidence suggests that, post-conversion, the Labour academies enrol
pupils with higher end-of-primary-school test scores and other advantageous
background characteristics (for example, fewer pupils eligible for free school
meals).4 We therefore consider how similar this trend has been for the pre- and
post-May-2010 academy schools.
To preview our findings, we find that the programmes are significantly
different in terms of the school characteristics that are associated with
3Note that we focus on secondary schools as there were no primary academies during the Labour period.
See Eyles, Machin and McNally (2016) for a study of primary school academisation post-2010.
4Machin and Wilson, 2008; Machin and Vernoit, 2011; Wilson, 2011; Eyles and Machin, 2015.
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conversion – in particular, school average Key Stage 4 (end-of-secondary-
schooling) attainment, incidence of pupils eligible for free school meals (a
proxy for low family income) and inspectorate (Ofsted) ratings. Schools
converting under the two policy periods are also different in terms of
the quality of new enrolments to the school as measured by pupils’ prior
Key Stage 2 (end-of-primary-schooling) achievement and eligibility for free
school meals. This clearly shows that the programmes are not prima facie
comparable, and therefore that findings from the earlier conversions cannot be
meaningfully extrapolated to later conversions. That said, we also highlight
some commonalities, suggesting that a more careful and nuanced comparison
could in some circumstances be undertaken.Wediscuss this later inmore detail,
but one clear instance is that comparing Labour-type ‘sponsored’ academies in
both regimes may be a relatively legitimate comparison to draw. Conversely,
any extrapolation from ‘sponsored’ academies to coalition ‘converters’ would
be a distorted comparison likely to lead to biased conclusions.
Our evidence contributes to a small but growing literature on the nature
and effects of academy schools. The first round of studies focused on a small
number of early Labour academies and investigated the effect of conversion
on pupil achievement at the end of secondary schooling.5 More recently,
Eyles and Machin (2015) conducted a comprehensive causal evaluation
of the Labour academies programme, studying both intake and end-of-
secondary-school performance effects, while Eyles, Hupkau and Machin
(2016) investigated a longer-term post-compulsory-schooling impact of
academies (mainly studying students’ university enrolment). The authors found
significant changes in the ability composition of pupils enrolling at academies
after conversion. This result echoes the findings of Wilson (2011). However,
no empirical investigation has so far been undertaken to quantitatively assess
the (dis)similarities between the Labour and coalition government academies.
Our study fills this gap.
Our work also contributes to a larger literature on the effect of different
school types on pupil enrolment and performance. While research on the
impact of attending different types of schools is extensive,6 there is much
less evidence on what happens when the type of school attended by pupils
changes. One study closely related to this paper, albeit from an earlier period,
is the analysis of grant-maintained (GM) schools by Clark (2009) in England
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.7 Clark documented significant test score
improvements, but provided limited evidence on changes in pupil intake.
In the US, the growing body of work on charter schools is clearly related
to our work because charters have similarities to academies even though most
5Machin and Wilson, 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; National Audit Office, 2010; Machin and
Vernoit, 2011.
6Neal, 1997; Gibbons and Silva, 2011.
7GM schools were renamed as foundation schools in the Schools Act 1998.
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charters are new schools while academies are not.8 A smaller number of
studies have focused on the less frequent conversions of already existing
schools to charters9 or the introduction of charter-like practices to US public
schools.10 Most of these studies analysed the causal effect of charter attendance
on students’ performance by exploiting the use of lotteries by oversubscribed
schools; therefore, they cannot provide (by construction) evidence on the effect
of charter conversion on pupil intake. Finally, the evidence on Swedish free
schools11 is also related to our work – in particular, the analysis by Bo¨hlmark
andLindahl (2007), who show that free schools tend to enrol pupils frombetter-
off families and affect the composition of pupils in public sector schools.
Although the background of the academy policy differs from both the US
charters and the Swedish free school programme, we believe our work sheds
light on related issues about school reform that are of general interest. First, we
provide evidence on how the characteristics of pupils and schools change as
the impetus of the programme changes from addressing underperformance to
providingmore autonomy to all schools. Second, we provide such evidence in a
setting where expansion of a more autonomous school sector has not happened
at the margin, but has taken centre stage and become a reality for more than
60 per cent of secondary schools over a six-year period. These features make
the ongoing English academy reform a truly exceptional experiment in terms
of its scale and celerity. Given the growing trend towards more decentralised
and autonomous education systems, our work is relevant for academics and
policymakers alike.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
discuss the institutional context and the data we use in our empirical analysis.
In Section III, we spell out in more detail the methods that we use. Section
IV presents our results on the association between school characteristics and
the probability of converting to academy status, while Section V discusses our
results on changes in pupil intake. Finally, Section VI provides conclusions.
II. Institutional context and data
1. The English school system
Compulsory education in England is organised into Key Stages (KSs) that
stretch over the course of primary and secondary education. In terms of primary
schooling, pupils enter school at age 4–5. This is known as the Foundation
Stage. They then move on to KS1 (up until age 6–7), before finishing at KS2.
8See Hoxby and Murarka (2009), Angrist et al. (2010), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) and Dobbie and
Fryer (2011).
9Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2016.
10Fryer, 2014.
11Ahlin, 2003; Bjo¨rklund et al., 2005; Sandstro¨m and Bergstro¨m, 2005.
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The latter covers the last four years of primary schooling (completing at age
10–11), and ends with the externally marked KS2 standardised national tests
(SATs) where proficiency in English, mathematics and science is assessed.
Secondary schooling covers age 11–12 through to age 15–16 and is divided
into KS3 (the three years up to age 13–14) and KS4 (ages 14–15 and 15–16),
which marks the end of compulsory education. At the end of KS4, pupils sit
externally marked academic (GCSE) and/or vocational (NVQ/BTEC) tests in
a range of subjects, although English, maths and science are compulsory for
every student at this stage. In our analysis, we focus on secondary schooling
because this is where the majority of conversions to academies have taken
place and because there were no primary school academies prior to May 2010.
For each of the Key Stages, the central government sets learning targets
(levels) and runs a national curriculum. Average attainments within a school
at the various Key Stages, as well as measures of school value added, are
published alongside other school characteristics (such as size and composition)
in annual performance tables. These are highly salient in the education and
policy debate and the media. They are also routinely used by parents when
choosing a school for their children.
Despite the principle of ‘free choice’ guiding the process of school
applications and admissions practices, parental freedom to choose is limited
when schools are oversubscribed.When this occurs, various admissions criteria
are used to prioritise students, usually favouring those who live nearby, those
with special educational needs or in the care of the local authority (LA) and
those with siblings in the school. Religious schools can prioritise students
according to their faith, while a small proportion of secondary schools select
on admissions tests (grammar schools).
The institutional arrangements of secondary schools determine more
precisely whether the school, as opposed to the LA, holds responsibility
for admissions and the margin of freedom the school enjoys over taught
curriculum, personnel management and strategic decision-making. Secondary
schools can take one of the following alternative structures: community
schools, voluntary-controlled (VC) schools, foundation schools, voluntary-
aided (VA) schools and, since their introduction in the early 2000s, academy
schools.12 Although academies are the focus of our work, we briefly discuss
the structures of other school types for comparison.13
12Any of these school types can be a selective ‘grammar’ and admit pupils on the basis of entry tests.
13One final school type was community technology colleges (CTCs), which enjoyed relative autonomy
from the LA. In particular, the majority of their governing body was filled with representatives of the
sponsor – usually a business or voluntary group – and the school had control over staffing and admission
decisions. However, CTCs followed the national teaching curriculum and were characterised by a strong
emphasis on technological, scientific and practical subjects. CTCs represented a very small share of the
secondary education sector and nearly all have converted to academies, so we do not consider this group in
our analysis.
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Community and VC schools are mainly managed by the LA and by
a governing body predominantly composed of members of staff and LA
representatives. Since the majority of VC schools are religiously denominated,
their governing body also includes members of the foundation supporting
the school. Responsibility for recruiting, human resources decisions and
admissions is in the hands of the LA.As a result, these schools are characterised
by very little autonomy.
Voluntary-aided and foundation schools are similarly structured even
though VA schools are mainly religiously denominated while foundation
schools are not. These two types of school are run as partnerships between the
state and voluntary sectors, and their associated foundations have a significant
representation on their governing bodies. These institutional arrangements
grant VA and foundation schools more autonomy than community and VC
institutions.
Lastly, academy schools enjoy a much larger degree of autonomy than
other school types in the state system. Academies were gradually introduced
by the Labour government in September 2002 with the aim of replacing failing
schools. The programme was designed as a targeted intervention aimed at
addressing underperformance by changing organisational structure, providing
schools with more autonomy and linking schools to government-approved
sponsors enlisted to drive educational improvements. Indeed, sponsors –
usually educational charities or business groups – were seen as crucial in
bringing to schools a more entrepreneurial ‘ethos’.
The election of the Conservative–Liberal-Democrat coalition government
inMay 2010 dramatically changed the aims of the programme. The Academies
Act of June 2010 allowed asmany schools as possible – including primaries – to
‘convert’ to academies and removed the requirement that would-be academies
had to find a sponsor. Although a number of new Labour-type ‘sponsored’
academies have opened since, more than 80 per cent of the expansion of the
academy sector has happened through coalition-type ‘converters’.
Importantly, in the new regime, greater emphasis is put on the voluntary
process of conversion to academy status. While schools classed as ‘eligible
for intervention’ can still have sponsored academy status imposed upon them,
underperforming (rather than failing) schools can now voluntarily enter into
discussions with sponsors – mainly large well-performing chains of schools
(for example, the Ark or Harris Federation networks) – and become academies
under their aegis in order to address low standards. On the other hand, all
that is required from would-be ‘converters’ is that they discuss the possibility
of converting with ‘such persons as they think appropriate’; typically, this
includes parents, members of staff, pupils, and the foundation or religious
body backing the school (if any). They must then register their intention to
apply with the Department for Education (DfE) and send in information about
school attainment, pupil progress and school finances for the past three years,
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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before finally providing the most recent school report prepared by the school
inspectorate (Ofsted).
The last is a key determinant of approval for conversion. Ofsted visits
schools every three to five years (although this frequency depends on school
performance, with poor performers visitedmore often) and inspections result in
publicly available reports rating schools from ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Inadequate’ on
their overall quality aswell as on specific aspects such as teaching,management
and pupil behaviour.14 Originally, schools with an ‘Outstanding’ overall rating
were fast-tracked and pre-approved for conversion by the DfE. However,
as the coalition and then Conservative governments continued their push to
expand the programme, schools with a ‘Good, with Outstanding Features’
rating as well as schools displaying upward trajectories in attainments and
quality of management / teaching practices were subsequently allowed to
convert. Broadly speaking, the process of (voluntary) conversion can take
between three and five months, though the time lapse can expand and the exact
timing depends on specific aspects of the proposed conversion and the volume
of new applications.
Despite these differences, both ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies
enjoy similarly wide margins of autonomy. Although they remain part of
the state sector, they fall outside the control of the LA in terms of key strategic
decisions and day-to-day management. These are administered by the head
teacher and a self-appointed board of governors with a limited number of
representatives from the LA. This body has responsibility for hiring the staff,
negotiating pay and working conditions, and deciding on matters such as
career development, discipline and performance management. Furthermore,
academies enjoy more autonomy in terms of the majority of the taught
curriculum (except for English, maths, science and IT, where they have to
follow the national curriculum), as well as in the structure and length of the
school day.
According to the Department for Education (2014) survey of academies’
freedoms, 63 per cent of secondary academies have changed the performance
management system for their teachers following conversion, 60 per cent
have changed the curriculum offered and 51 per cent have changed school
leadership. On the other hand, only 10 per cent and 6 per cent have increased
the length of the school day or school term respectively – mainly because of
opposition from teachers. Interestingly, the majority of schools report that they
converted to academy status in order to ‘gain greater freedom to use funding as
they see fit’ and ‘raise educational standards’, and approximately 70 per cent
claim that the changes introduced following conversion either moderately or
substantially improved attainments.
14More details on Ofsted, its inspections and the possible outcomes are provided in Eyles and Machin
(2015).
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2. Data construction and sample selection
The main data source used in our analysis is the National Pupil Database
(NPD). The NPD is obtained by linking several centrally gathered data sets
that collect information on the characteristics of all pupils in state-maintained
primary and secondary schools, their attainment at the various Key Stages, and
the characteristics of the schools they attend. These databases are used by the
DfE to assess schools’ performance and funding needs and, as such, are highly
reliable and contain very few missing observations.
A core element of the NPD is the Pupil Level Annual School Census
(PLASC) data, which contain information on the characteristics of pupils in
each year of compulsory schooling. These data comprise both time-varying
characteristics – such as free school meal eligibility status (a proxy for
low parental income) and special educational needs status – alongside time-
invariant factors such as ethnicity. The data also contain the identity of the
school attended by students in every year of their schooling. The school
attended in Year 7 is a crucial piece of information since it allows us to identify
the school where pupils start their secondary education and to evaluate any
effect of academy conversion on pupil intake.
Since its inception in 2002, PLASC has been collected each January; in
addition, there have been collections in May and October since 2006. We use
the January collection because this contains all relevant pupil-level information
and is available in all the years that we study.
For our analysis, we also gather data on pupils’ KS2 and KS4 attainment.
For KS2, we focus on test scores across the three compulsory subjects assessed
at this stage – English, maths and science. Test scores in science span the 0–80
range (coming from the sum of two separate papers each marked out of 40),
while the English and maths tests are marked out of 100 (both composed of the
sum of two separate test scores, eachmarked out of 50).We use KS2 test scores
averaged across the three subjects.15 At KS4, we consider attainment in the
more academic GCSEs and the vocationally oriented GNVQs and BTECs.16
GCSEs are graded A∗–G and the points score calculations give an A∗ a score
of 8 and a G a score of 1, with grades in between going up in increments of 1.
GNVQs/BTECs are converted into GCSE equivalents before being assigned a
point score. The point measure used in the analysis refers to the grades obtained
in the best eight qualifications. Capping qualifications at the best eight allows
us to deal with the possibility that pupils entering many exams, but performing
poorly in all of them, would still appear to do well. However, this restriction
is inconsequential for our results.
15All observations from the 2010–11 school year use the average of English and maths alone since
science tests became fully teacher-assessed in 2010.
16GCSE stands for General Certificate of Secondary Education, GNVQ for General National Vocational
Qualification and BTEC for Business and Technology Education Council.
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Finally, the NPD also collects information at the school level – in particular,
data on school types and institutional arrangements – through the Annual
School Census and Edubase. We use these data in conjunction with files
provided by theDfE, which give information on all academies that have opened
(or are in the process of doing so), to identify schools that become academies,
their time and mode of conversion (‘sponsored’ or ‘converter’ route), and the
predecessor school that underwent transformation.
We use this information to construct two data sets. The first one is a school-
level panel of secondary schools covering the period spanning the school years
2002–03 to 2012–13. This data set includes all schools meeting our selection
criteria (explained below) and comprises an indicator for whether the school
is an academy in a given academic year alongside a rich set of school-level
characteristics measured in the previous year. We use this data set to study
which school characteristics are associated with conversion to academy status
and investigatewhether these associations change from the Labour government
years to the coalition government period. For our analysis, we only retain
secondary schools that cover the whole of the KS3 and KS4 phases (age
11–12 to age 15–16) over the sample period 2002–03 to 2012–13; therefore,
we drop middle schools (which stop at or before KS3) and upper secondary
schools (which start after age 11–12). This restriction is motivated by the fact
that our goal is to analyse the link between academy conversion and school
characteristics – in particular, the KS4 attainment of the predecessor school
and average KS2 attainment of the (age 11–12) intake at the school. Middle
and upper secondary schools do not have the complete set of information we
plan to use.17
Table 1 reports the cumulative number of open academies in our sample
of secondary schools over the years covered by our investigation.18 We define
a school as being open as an academy in a given academic year if it became
an academy in or before September of that year. For instance, a school that
converted in September 2011 would be classed as being an academy from the
2011–12 academic year, whereas a school opening in October 2011 would
be classed as opening in 2012–13. A school’s first year of treatment is thus
the first full academic year that it begins with academy status. We studied the
extent to which our results are robust to this definition.
17There were approximately 3,500 secondary schools in England in 2002; of these, 300 were middle
schools, 228 were upper schools and a further 42 were classed as junior or senior schools that did not admit
pupils of either age 11–12 or age 15–16. We only consider schools that had pupils aged 11–12 to 15–16 in
all years of our analysis. This cuts the sample further because of school closures and missing data in some
years (this occurs if, for instance, some institutions became middle schools midway through the sample).
In some robustness checks, we re-estimated all our results using an unbalanced panel that included schools
with missing years (but still dropped middle/upper schools). Our findings were completely unchanged.
18Note that these numbers do not precisely match the official statistics published by the DfE because
of the restrictions we impose on our data. However, our data reproduce the main trends in terms of sector
expansion and the relative importance of ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies.
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TABLE 1
Number of academies over time: overall and by conversion type
Academic year Overall Converter Sponsored
2001–02 0 0 0
2002–03 3 0 3
2003–04 9 0 9
2004–05 11 0 11
2005–06 18 0 18
2006–07 32 0 32
2007–08 57 0 57
2008–09 94 0 94
2009–10 152 0 152
2010–11 231 23 208
2011–12 878 629 249
2012–13 1,266 963 303
2013–14 1,470 1,101 369
2014–15 1,494 1,114 380
2015–16 1,595 1,168 427
Note: The table reports number of academies opening in different years. The sample only considers schools
that are in the sample every year between 2001–02 and 2012–13. Data on academies opening refer to data
available up to May 2016. Three of the sponsored academies assigned to the academic year 2010–11 opened
before May 2010. They are therefore treated as part of the Labour years. Total number of secondary schools
in the sample: 2,716 (out of approximately 3,500 secondary schools in England; see body text and footnote
17 for data construction and sample restrictions).
Overall, academies went from representing just a few exceptional cases in
the early 2000s to coveringmore than half of secondary schools by 2016. There
are, of course, no ‘converters’ prior to the school year 2010–11. Interestingly,
the table shows that most of the academy sector expansion between 2010–
11 and 2012–13 occurred through the ‘converter’ route. The number of
‘sponsored’ academies underwent a sizeable increase in the same period –
from 208 to 303. However, ‘converters’ went from zero in 2009–10 to just
under a thousand three years later. This represents more than 80 per cent of
the overall expansion of the academy sector in this period.
Although our analysis only covers the period up to the school year 2012–13,
we also collected information on schools that converted in 2013–14, 2014–
15 and 2015–16. We use data published online by the DfE in May 2016 to
track academies already opened by this point.19 Consistent with the post-2010
trend, the figures for these last three school years continue to show that the
expansion of the academy sector is mainly occurring through ‘conversions’.
19https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-academies-and-academy-projects-in-
development.
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Nevertheless, a number of Labour-type ‘sponsored’ academies have continued
to open during the coalition government period.
The second data set that we construct is a pupil-level database that assigns
pupils to the school they attend at the beginning of secondary school (when
children are aged 11–12 and right after the KS2 exams). We use this data
set to study whether schools converting to an academy change their pupil
intake post-conversion. For most of our analysis, we only consider schools
that convert to academies during the coalition government years – that is, from
the academic year 2010–11 to present. This is because Wilson (2011) and
Eyles and Machin (2015) have already presented evidence on the impact of
Labour’s academies on pupil intake, reporting positive effects. However, in
some cases, we provide complementary evidence for the Labour years. We
apply the same restrictions as in the school-level data set. Furthermore, we
only consider the following pupils: (i) pupils enrolled at academies that open
between 2010–11 and 2012–13 and in the time window covering six school
years prior to conversion and up to two school years after conversion; and (ii)
pupils enrolled at academies that will open between 2013–14 and 2015–16
and in the time window going from six school years to one school year prior
to conversion. These restrictions are applied so that our analysis of the effect
of academy conversion on pupil intake composition compares the changes in
the composition of actual academies (pre- and post-conversion) with changes
in the composition of future academies. We return to this point in the next
section, where we discuss our empirical methods.
III. Empirical methods
1. Research design I: school characteristics and academy conversion
In the first part of our analysis, we investigate which characteristics predict
academy conversion and whether the association between these characteristics
and academy status changes between the Labour and coalition government
periods.
In order to do so, we estimate the following linear probability model for
school s in year t:
Ast = α + X ′s,t−1 × I (t ≤ 2010) + X
′
s,t−1 × I (t > 2010)(1)
+ϑs,t−1 + λs,t−1 + τt + εst ,
where Ast is a dummy variable coded equal to 0 when school s is not an
academy, 1 in the school year in which school s starts operating as an academy,
and missing after that point; X ′s,t−1 is a set of school attributes measured in the
school year prior to the conversion; I (t ≤ 2010) is a binary indicator taking
the value 1 for observations up to the school year 2009–10 (and 0 otherwise)
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identifying the ‘Labour years’; and I (t > 2010) is a binary indicator taking
the value 1 for observations from the school year 2010–11 onwards (and 0
otherwise) identifying the ‘coalition years’.20 ϑs,t−1 identifies a set of dummies
characterising the institutional type of the predecessor school (for example,
community or voluntary-controlled – see Section II.1), while λs,t−1 is a set
of dummies denoting the local authority in which the predecessor school is
located (as well as the academy – there are no cross-LA relocations) and τt
are school-year dummies. Finally, εst is an error term, which we assume to be
uncorrelated with all other observable characteristics in the model. However,
we allow for a degree of autocorrelation in the residuals within schools over
time, and cluster standard errors at the school level.
Themain parameters of interest are and, which capture the associations
between school characteristics and the probability of conversion in the ‘Labour
years’ and in the ‘coalition years’, respectively. The differences between these
coefficients (and their statistical significance) are key to this paper since they
allow us to test the notion that the nature of academies has changed since the
Academies Act of 2010.
The way in which we have specified the dependent variable makes our
analysis similar to a transition model where schools are ‘at risk’ of becoming
academies. This allows us to isolate the effect of school characteristics at
time t–1 on the probability of conversion at time t – without confounding this
estimate with an effect of these characteristics on the probability of being an
academy from time t onwards (i.e. survival). Since academies do not convert
back to non-academy status, the observations after conversion has occurred
do not add any useful element of variation to our analysis and are essentially
disregarded (by coding our dependent variable as missing).
We are also interested in analysing whether the association between school
characteristics and academy status changes for different types of academies.
For example, during the coalition government years, we observe schools
becoming ‘converter’ (coalition-type) as well as ‘sponsored’ (Labour-type)
academies. Moreover, both types of academies can be ‘stand-alone’ or be part
of a ‘chain’ – that is, belong to a group working together under a shared
structure and jointly administered by an academy trust.
To test for these differences, we estimate the following model:
Asubgroupst = α + X ′s,t−1	 + ϑs,t−1 + λs,t−1 + τt + εst ,(2)
20Three academies that we classify as belonging to the academic year 2010–11 – i.e. open before
September 2010 – actually converted before May 2010. We assign them to the Labour years. Additionally,
a very small number of sponsored academies open by September 2010 applied during the Labour years
but were approved during the coalition period. We assign these ‘hybrid’ schools to the coalition years.
However, we have experimented with different cut-off dates to assign schools to the pre-/post-2010 period.
Our checks show that our results are robust. This is because the vast majority of the post-2010 academies
are ‘converters’, for which there is no ambiguity.
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which redefines the dependent variable to take the value 1 only for academy
transitions into a specific subgroup – for example, only ‘chain academies’
– and taking values 0 or missing as previously discussed. In order to test
whether the effects of school characteristics on the probability of becoming an
academy are significantly different across subgroups, we set the problem up
as a seemingly unrelated equation system so that our tests for the differences
in the 	 parameters take into account the joint variance/covariance structure
of the error terms across equations.
2. Key descriptive statistics: school-level data
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use in our
school-level analysis. The dependent variable ‘Academy’ (A in the equations)
takes a mean value of 0.045 across the period, although this figure varies
substantially from the Labour years (0.007) to the coalition years (0.161).
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics: school-level data
Mean Standard deviation
Academy 0.045 0.206
KS4 attainment [t–1] 42.22 11.08
Proportion FSME [t–1] 0.154 0.129
Proportion male [t–1] 0.506 0.188
Proportion white British [t–1] 0.790 0.254
KS2 attainment [t–1] 64.58 6.795
Ofsted Grade 1 [t–1] 0.225 0.418
Ofsted Grade 2 [t–1] 0.435 0.496
Ofsted Grade 3 [t–1] 0.295 0.456
Ofsted Grade 4 [t–1] 0.045 0.208
Community school [t–1] 0.585 0.493
Voluntary-controlled school [t–1] 0.027 0.163
Voluntary-aided school [t–1] 0.177 0.382
Foundation school [t–1] 0.204 0.403
School in Labour-held council [t–1] 0.260 0.439
School in Conservative-held council [t–1] 0.451 0.497
Percentage of schools that are academies in local
authority [t–1]
3.495 8.684
Note: Number of observations: 28,391 in 2,716 schools. Number of observations drops when considering
Ofsted scores, due to missing reports for the early years (23,813 in 2,702 schools). ‘Academy’ is coded as 0
for years in which schools are not academies, 1 for the first year in which the school becomes an academy and
missing for all years after the school has become an academy. KS4 attainment is the point score calculated
across the best eight subjects and includes GCSE equivalents. KS2 attainment is the point score calculated
over English, maths and science. FSME indicates pupils eligible for free school meals. Ofsted Grades are
as follows: 1 = Outstanding; 2 = Good; 3 = Requiring improvement; and 4 = Inadequate.
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This marked difference is due to the fact that many more academies opened
since 2010–11. Thefigures for the school characteristicswe consider (measured
in the school year prior to conversion) reveal that our set of schools is broadly
representative of secondary schools in England. Approximately 15 per cent of
the pupils are eligible for free meals and nearly 80 per cent are white British.21
KS2 attainment of pupils aged 11–12 in their first year of secondary school has
a mean value of approximately 65, while KS4 scores of pupils aged 15–16 are,
on average, just above 42. In terms of Ofsted inspections, the most recurrent
grade is ‘Grade 2’ (Good) at around 43.5 per cent.Many schools achieve ‘Grade
1’ (Outstanding; 22.5 per cent) and ‘Grade 3’ (Requiring improvement; 29.5
per cent). Only 4.5 per cent receive a low ‘Grade 4’ evaluation (Inadequate).
Approximately 60 per cent of all predecessor schools are either community
(58.5 per cent) or VC schools (2.7 per cent), which have little autonomy prior
to becoming academies.
3. Research design II: academy conversion and school intake
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate whether schools converting
to academy status change their pupil intake following conversion. In order
to do so, we use pupil-level data (described in Section II.2) and estimate the
following model:
Bist = αs + τt + δAs × I (E ≥ t = c) + ξist ,(3)
where Bist denotes the background of pupil i (aged 11–12) starting secondary
school s in school year t; αs and τt denote school and time fixed effects
respectively; As denotes whether the school becomes an academy at some point
during the observation window; and I (E ≥ t = c) is an indicator variable
taking the value 1 for all school years in which the school is operating as an
academy. Finally, ξist is an error term, which we assume to be uncorrelated
with all other observable characteristics in equation 3. We allow for a degree
of autocorrelation in the residuals of pupils in the same school and over years,
and cluster standard errors at the school level.
The main coefficient of interest is δ, which captures the effect of academy
conversion on intake. One concern with our specification is that it only controls
for time-fixed school unobservables; however, schools that become / do not
become academies could differ along other unobservable dimensions that
might be time varying and/or time trending. In order to mitigate this problem,
we only estimate themodel in equation 3 using observations from the following
subset of pupils (already discussed in Section II.2): (i) pupils enrolled at schools
21In order to make all schools in the sample comparable, these variables are measured for pupils between
the ages of 11 and 16.
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that become academies between 2010–11 and 2012–13 and in the time window
covering six school years prior to conversion and up to two school years after
conversion; and (ii) pupils enrolled at schools that will become academies
between 2013–14 and 2015–16 and in the time window going from six school
years to one school year prior to conversion. This approach basically compares
the evolution of the intake at schools that actually open as academies during
our observation period (pre- and post-conversion) with the evolution of the
intake at schools that will open as academies in the near future. Identification
rests on the assumptions that the two groups of schools are on similar trends
and share similar (possibly time-varying) unobservables, and that the timing
of the actual opening is ‘as good as random’.
The empirical model in equation 3 imposes an average effect of academy
conversion on intake quality that is constant across all post-conversion years.
To relax this assumption, we estimate the following flexible event study
specification where we allow for separate ‘academy effects’ in the different
school years pre- and post-conversion:
Bist = αs + τt +
e = c+2∑
e = c−5
δe As × I (E = e) + ξist ,(4)
where the expression I (E = e) denotes a set of indicators that separately
identify the school years prior to conversion year c (from c–5 to c–1, with
c–6 being the excluded baseline year) and at/after conversion (from c to c+2),
and the δes capture the effect of academy status on intake in each specific
year. Note that estimates of δe for the years prior to conversion allow us to
determine whether actual converters (the ‘treated’ schools) differ from future
converters (the ‘control’ schools) in the years leading up to the ‘switch’ to
academy. This helps us assess the validity of our assumption that treated and
control schools would have had parallel trends in the outcome variable in the
absence of treatment.
As for the school-level analysis of the determinants of conversion, we are
interested in whether the effects on intake are heterogeneous for different
types of academies. In particular, we are interested in heterogeneity along the
margins of ‘sponsored’ versus ‘converter’ and ‘stand-alone’ versus ‘chain’
academies. In order to assess these differences, we interact the variable As in
equation 3 with an indicator denoting whether the academy belongs to one of
these groups.
4. Key descriptive statistics: pupil-level data
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the characteristics of pupils in our
sample. These are the variables we use to characterise pupils’ backgrounds
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TABLE 3
Descriptive statistics: pupil-level data
Mean Standard deviation
KS2 attainment 67.06 16.37
Pupil is FSME 0.143 0.350
Pupil is male 0.506 0.500
Pupil is white British 0.830 0.376
School in Labour-held council [t–1] 0.191 0.393
School in Conservative-held council [t–1] 0.591 0.492
Percentage of schools that are academies in local
authority [t–1]
0.145 0.220
Note: Number of observations: 1,895,614 (1,714,974 for KS2) pupils in 1,440 schools. Sample includes:
observations up to 2012–13 for academies opened in 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2012–13 in the time window
[c–6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2012–13 for academies that will
open in 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16 in the time window [c–6, c–1] (control group). KS2 attainment is
the point score calculated over English, maths and science. FSME indicates pupils eligible for free school
meals.
(i.e. the variables Bist in equations 3 and 4). KS2 attainment of pupils when
they enter secondary school (aged 11–12) are on average 67 points, 2½ points
above the corresponding figure in the school-level panel. This discrepancy is
explained by the fact that the pupil-level data only focus onmore recent cohorts
and KS2 scores have been rising over time. The percentage of pupils eligible
for free meals (at 14.3 per cent) is close to the figure found at the school
level, as is the percentage of pupils who are white British (at 83 per cent).
Finally, approximately 58 per cent of the pupils are in schools that were either
community or VC schools prior to conversion (not tabulated). This figure is
close to what we find in the school-level panel (at 61 per cent).
IV. The changing characteristics of academies
1. Preliminary graphical evidence
We present our first set of results graphically in Figure 1. The three left-hand-
side plots display themean academy percentile in the non-academy distribution
of school characteristics in the year prior to conversion for the following three
attributes: KS4 attainment (top left panel), KS2 attainment (central left panel)
and percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals (bottom left panel).
The figure also reports the mean percentile for academies that convert during
the Labour government years and the mean percentile for those converting
during the coalition government years. The approach we take in Figure 1 is
an adaptation of the methods used in the labour economics research of Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce (1993), and highlights changes in the characteristics of
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 1
The changing profile of academies
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Note: All panels in the figure present the mean academy percentile in the non-academy distribution in the
school year prior to conversion for the characteristics in the headings of the plots (dots). The left panels
also show the mean percentile for the Labour years (solid line) and the mean percentile for the coalition
years (dashed line). The right panels instead show the mean percentile for the coalition years for sponsored
academies (dashed line) and the mean percentile for the coalition years for converter academies (dotted
line). On the horizontal axes, years refer to the beginning of the academic year (for example, 2002 refers to
2002–03).
converting schools, before and after the Academies Act of June 2010, in a
descriptive and intuitive way.
The top two panels provide fairly sharp evidence of these changes: the
KS4 and KS2 percentiles of schools that convert during the Labour period
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(measured up to 2008–09 for conversions up to 2009–10) are substantially
lower than those for the coalition period. The average Labour academy
percentile is very low, at 8 for both KS4 andKS2. This finding is not surprising:
Labour’s ‘sponsored’ academies were among the worst-performing schools
and academisation was seen as a way to improve standards. In sharp contrast,
the average KS4 and KS2 percentiles for the years following the election of the
coalition government were above the median, at the 53rd and 57th percentiles
for KS4 and KS2, respectively. Strikingly, in the first full school year after the
Academies Act of June 2010 (that is, for conversions in the school year 2010–
11 with characteristics measured in 2009–10), academies’ average percentiles
are around 80 for both KS2 and KS4.
In the bottom panel of the figure, we investigate whether similarly sharp
changes can be detected in the school composition in terms of pupils’ eligibility
for FSM (i.e. a measure of family disadvantage). The figure shows that, during
the Labour years, the average percentile for FSM eligibility was close to 90.
This pattern changes substantially during the coalition period. Indeed, the
average percentile falls to 54, and the drop is substantially more pronounced
(down to under 40) if a focus is placed on the first full school year after the
Academies Act of June 2010.
The three right-hand-side panels investigate whether the pattern we detect
by bundling together post-2010 ‘converter’ and ‘sponsored’ academies masks
substantial heterogeneity. We find that this is the case. Post-2010 ‘sponsored’
academies are relatively similar to pre-2010 ‘sponsored’ academies, albeit
slightly less disadvantaged and poorly performing. Conversely, separating out
the post-2010 ‘converters’ clearly shows that the new type of schools gaining
academy status via this route are radically different from schools converting
via the ‘sponsored’ route. The average KS4 percentiles of pre-2010 and post-
2010 ‘sponsored’ academies are respectively 8 and 14, whereas the average
KS4 percentile for ‘converters’ is 72. A similar pattern emerges when looking
at KS2 percentiles. Lastly, the average percentile for FSM eligibility was
89 for pre-2010 ‘sponsored’ academies, moving down to 77 for post-2010
‘sponsored’ academies and dropping to 38 for ‘converters’.
2. Main regression analysis
In this subsection, we provide more formal evidence on the changes in the
nature of academies by estimating the model laid out in equation 1 for studying
the effect of school and local characteristics measured at time t–1 on the
probability of conversion at time t. Our estimates are presented in Table 4.
The table has the following structure. Columns 1–3 present simple models that
only consider KS4 attainment, the incidence of FSM-eligible pupils and the
percentages of male andwhite British pupils. Columns 4–6 add further controls
for Ofsted ratings and predecessor school types as well as LA dummies. Lastly,
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columns 7–9 include a control for the percentage of secondary schools that
are academies in the LA where the school is located as well as dummies
indicating whether the local council is (majority) Labour-held or (majority)
Conservative-held.22 Further, columns 1, 4 and 7 focus on the Labour years,
while columns 2, 5 and 8 show the estimates for the coalition period; columns
3, 6 and 9 present the difference in the effects between the two periods.
Starting with the first three columns, our results show that during the
Labour years lower KS4 attainment and a higher share of pupils eligible
for FSM were positively and significantly associated with the probability of
conversion. This pattern is completely reversed during the coalition years:
higher KS4 attainment and a lower percentage of FSM-eligible pupils are
strongly associated with a higher probability of becoming an academy. As
shown in column 3, the differences in these associations are not only striking –
the coefficients push in clearly opposing directions – but also highly significant.
As for the percentage of male and white British pupils in the school, we find
that these are not strongly associated with academisation during either period,
and their effects do not change significantly.23
In columns 4–6, we include LA dummies as well as Ofsted ratings and
predecessor school types. The omitted categories are respectively ‘Grade 1’
(Outstanding) and community schools. Note that sincewe are not able to collect
consistent Ofsted data for the late 1990s and early 2000s, we lose some schools
for whichwe are unable to gather inspection results pre-conversion. Our results
show that during the Labour years, schools with the lowest inspection results
– Grade 4 schools – were more likely to become academies. This finding is
completely reversed during the coalition years: the coefficient on this dummy
in column 5 is negative and significant, and column 6 shows that this difference
is highly significant. Similarly, we find that ‘Requiring improvement’ schools
are significantly less likely to become academies after 2010. Lastly, we find
that ‘Good’ schools are less likely to become academies than ‘Outstanding’
schools in both periods. Although this is somewhat puzzling for the pre-2010
‘sponsored’ academies, the stronger and significantly more negative effect
after 2010 is in line with expectations. In terms of predecessor school types,
we find evidence that foundation schools are more likely to convert after 2010
and VA schools are more likely to become academies before 2010. Finally, we
find that controlling for Ofsted ratings does not substantially affect the change
in the association between the percentage of FSM-eligible pupils and academy
conversion. However, the change in the association between academy and KS4
test scores is reduced – although it remains sizeable and significant. This is
22The omitted group includes councils held by the Liberal Democrats or other party or with no clear
majority.
23Note that we re-estimated these regressions using non-linear probit models to account more properly
for the small probability of academisation – especially in the Labour years. We found very similar results,
which are available on request.
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not surprising since Ofsted inspections incorporate a broader assessment about
the quality of teaching, which should translate into higher KS4 attainments (at
least in as much as these do not solely capture family background and pupils’
own ability, as opposed to school effectiveness).24
The last three columns of Table 4 add controls for the percentage of
academies in the LA and the party controlling the local council. We find
that a higher percentage of academies in the year prior to conversion has a
positive and significant effect on academisation during the coalition years but
not during the Labour years. Furthermore, we find that schools in Labour-held
councils were slightly more likely to convert during the Labour years (with
a marginally significant positive coefficient), but much less likely to become
academies after 2010. The difference in the association with this variable
between the two periods is highly significant. Conversely, we do not detect
any significant pattern or change in Conservative-held councils. As for the
variables already included in the previous specifications, these mainly retain
their size and significance. The only exception is the effect of the incidence
of FSM-eligible students at the school, which is now found to switch much
less between the two periods. This change is explained by the inclusion of
the Labour-held council dummy, which is strongly correlated with local (and
school) levels of deprivation.
How sizeable are the effects we have documented? To answer this question,
we first use the estimates of the first three columns of Table 4 – bounding our
calculations from above. A one standard deviation increase in KS4 test scores
corresponds to an 85 per cent ( = 0.006/0.007) decrease in the probability of
becoming an academy during the Labour years. Conversely, a one standard
deviation improvement in KS4 test scores would increase the probability of
becoming an academy during the coalition period by 21 per cent. Stated
differently, a school one standard deviation below average KS4 attainment
(approximately at the bottom 15th percentile assuming KS4 scores follow a
normal distribution) would be 85 per cent more likely to become an academy
during the Labour years, but 21 per cent less likely to do so during the coalition
period. If we use the estimates in columns 4–6, the impact of a one standard
deviation improvement in KS4 would be a 40 per cent reduction for the Labour
years and a 7 per cent increase for the coalition years. Although these numbers
are clearly smaller, it should be noted that they stem from variation in KS4
achievement conditional on Ofsted records and are likely to provide a lower
bound to the overall effect of academic quality on academisation in the two
regimes. Lastly, note that the estimates capturing the change in the effect of
24In Table A1 in the online appendix, we present additional results where we replace KS4 attainments of
Year 11 pupils – as a measure of school ‘output’ – with the KS2 attainments of Year 7 students – as a proxy
for ‘intake’ quality. We find consistent results. This is because school average KS2 and KS4 achievements
are highly correlated.
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attainment on the probability of becoming an academy range from 4 percentage
points (column 3) to 1.4 percentage points (column 6). This means that a
one standard deviation change in attainment would have pushed schools in
opposing directions by around 1.4–4 percentage points before and after the
Academies Act of 2010. Scaled against an average probability of conversion
over the whole period of 4.5 per cent, this is a very sizeable change.
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of the percentage of pupils
eligible for FSM at the school, we consider a 10 percentage point change from
the mean of 15.4 per cent. This corresponds to approximately 75 per cent of a
standard deviation change (i.e. 10 percentage points over 12.9 per cent). Using
the first three columns of Table 4, we find that, during the Labour years, an
increase in the percentage of FSM-eligible pupils of this magnitude would
have approximately corresponded to a 60 per cent increase in the probability
of becoming an academy. Conversely, during the coalition years, this same
increase would have basically reduced the probability of conversion to zero.
The change in the association between the percentage of FSM-eligible students
and the probability of becoming an academy pre-/post-2010 is similar in
columns 3 and 6, at –0.215 and –0.187, or around 2 percentage points for
a 10 percentage point change. Benchmarked against the average probability of
conversion across all years (of 4.5 per cent), the change in the effect of this
variable is also very substantial.
3. Further results
In Table 5, we present additional results on the changing nature of academies.
All regressions enter school characteristics simultaneously and control for both
LA dummies and predecessor school type.25
In panel A of the table, we investigate whether the changes in the
associations between the Labour years and the coalition years reflect the
differences between ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies. We find that
the patterns in the coefficients closely resemble our previous findings: the
association between KS4 attainment and ‘sponsored’ academies is negative
and significant, but it becomes positive and significant for ‘converters’. On
the other hand, the association between the share of FSM-eligible pupils and
‘sponsored’ academies is positive and significant, but it becomes negative
(though insignificant) for ‘converters’. Once again, we find that for both
variables, the change in these associations is significant. Note also that rescaled
against the probability of converting through a ‘sponsored’ or a ‘converter’
route (respectively at 1.1 per cent and 3.4 per cent), the magnitudes of the
associations presented in panel A of Table 5 are similar to those displayed
25We do not tabulate the effects of predecessor school types or of the shares of white British and male
pupils because these show no relevant changes or patterns compared with the estimates in Table 4.
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TABLE 5
Predecessor characteristics and probability of conversion: further results
A. Sponsored versus converter
(1)
Sponsored
academies
(2)
Converter
academies
(3)
Difference-
in-difference
Standardised KS4 point
score [t–1]
–0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
Proportion FSME [t–1] 0.108∗∗∗
(0.014)
–0.016
(0.015)
–0.124∗∗∗
(0.020)
Ofsted Grade 2 [t–1] –0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
–0.026∗∗∗
(0.003)
–0.019∗∗∗
(0.004)
Ofsted Grade 3 [t–1] 0.002
(0.002)
–0.051∗∗∗
(0.004)
–0.053∗∗∗
(0.004)
Ofsted Grade 4 [t–1] 0.032∗∗∗
(0.007)
–0.055∗∗∗
(0.005)
–0.087∗∗∗
(0.009)
B. Chain versus stand-alone
(1)
Chain
academies
(2)
Stand-alone
academies
(3)
Difference-
in-difference
Standardised KS4 point
score [t–1]
–0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
Proportion FSME [t–1] 0.063∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.029∗
(0.015)
–0.034
(0.022)
Ofsted Grade 2 [t–1] –0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
–0.016∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.002
(0.005)
Ofsted Grade 3 [t–1] –0.019∗∗∗
(0.003)
–0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
–0.011∗∗
(0.005)
Ofsted Grade 4 [t–1] 0.001
(0.006)
–0.024∗∗∗
(0.005)
–0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)
Note: The table reports coefficients, with standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses.
Number of observations: 23,813 in 2,702 schools. KS4 point score is calculated across the best eight
subjects and includes GCSE equivalents. Omitted Ofsted group: Grade 1 (Outstanding). The regressions
also control for the proportion of male pupils, the proportion of white British pupils, school type dummies
(community, voluntary-controlled, voluntary-aided and foundation) and local authority dummies. Omitted
school type: community school. Number of converter academies open within observation window: 963,
all during coalition years. Number of sponsored academies open within observation window: 155 during
Labour years and 148 during coalition years. Number of academies in chains: 108 sponsored academies open
during Labour years, 107 sponsored academies open during coalition years and 292 converter academies.
∗ significant at 10 per cent level; ∗∗ significant at 5 per cent level; ∗∗∗ significant at 1 per cent level or better.
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
The changing nature of academy schools in England 27
in Table 4. Consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 1, this suggests
that most of the dichotomy between the Labour years and the coalition years
can be explained by the difference in the relative number of schools becoming
academies via the ‘converter’ route.
In panel B, we investigate whether the association between school
characteristics and conversion differs for academies that belong to chains and
those that are stand-alone. This distinction is important given the prevalence
of multi-academy trusts (MATs) post-2010. Ladd and Fiske (2016) argue
that the recent White Paper on academies emphasises the ‘scaling up of
what works’ aspect of the programme much more than the potential for an
academised system to foster competition. We find that stand-alone academies
have significantly higher KS4 test scores in the year prior to conversion than
academies in chains. The size of the difference in this association is similar
to what we found before. On other hand, we find that chain academies are
not significantly more likely to have a higher fraction of FSM-eligible pupils
prior to conversion than stand-alone academies. Although the point estimate
on the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM is higher for schools that convert
to chain academies (at 0.063) than for stand-alone ones (at 0.029), the two
coefficients are not statistically different. Finally, we find similar patterns
to those documented before with respect to the Ofsted ratings, although
the patterns are less stark and significant. Note that whereas approximately
70 per cent of the ‘sponsored’ academies in our analysis are in chains, only
30 per cent of the ‘converters’ are. This suggests that the chain/stand-alone
margin substantially overlapswith the ‘sponsored’/‘converter’ one, reinforcing
our conclusion that differences along this latter margin explain the majority of
the pre-/post-2010 differences.
V. Academies and changes in intake composition
1. Main regression analysis
Table 6 presents our first set of results on changes in intake composition. This
comes from estimates of the empirical models in equations 3 and 4 in Section
III.3. The four different columns look at different aspects of a school’s intake:
column 1 focuses on the (standardised) KS2 test scores of pupils; column 2
focuses instead on whether or not the student is eligible for FSM; and columns
3 and 4 investigate the effect of academisation on the probability that enrolled
pupils are male or white British.
Panel A reports estimates of the average effect of conversion during the
coalition period on intake by pooling all post-conversion years. The results in
column 1 show that becoming an academy during the coalition period leads
to a small increase in the KS2 scores of enrolled pupils. Recall that KS2 tests
are taken at the end of primary school (i.e. they are a measure of prior ability)
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TABLE 6
Conversion and changes in school intake
A. Coalition years: intake effects
Dependent variable:
(1)
Standardised
KS2 point score
(2)
Pupil is
FSME
(3)
Pupil is
male
(4)
Pupil is white
British
Academy × Post-conversion
{E ∈ [c, c+2]}
0.010∗
(0.006)
–0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
–0.002
(0.002)
–0.004∗
(0.002)
B. Coalition years: timing analysis of intake effects
Dependent variable:
(1)
Standardised
KS2 point score
(2)
Pupil is
FSME
(3)
Pupil is
male
(4)
Pupil is white
British
Academy × {E = c–5} –0.015∗∗
(0.007)
0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
–0.005
(0.004)
Academy × {E = c–4} –0.007
(0.012)
–0.001
(0.004)
0.004
(0.004)
–0.007
(0.007)
Academy × {E = c–3} –0.009
(0.015)
–0.003
(0.005)
0.006
(0.004)
–0.008
(0.008)
Academy × {E = c–2} –0.007
(0.017)
–0.007
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)
–0.008
(0.008)
Academy × {E = c–1} 0.004
(0.018)
–0.005
(0.006)
0.004
(0.005)
–0.009
(0.008)
Academy × {E = c} 0.006
(0.019)
–0.010
(0.006)
0.002
(0.006)
–0.013
(0.009)
Academy × {E = c+1} 0.019
(0.020)
–0.016∗∗
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
–0.013
(0.009)
Academy × {E = c+2} 0.077∗∗∗
(0.029)
–0.002
(0.010)
–0.005
(0.010)
–0.007
(0.010)
C. Labour years: intake effects
Dependent variable:
(1)
Standardised
KS2 point score
(2)
Pupil is
FSME
(3)
Pupil is
male
(4)
Pupil is white
British
Academy × Post-conversion
{E ∈ [c, c+2]}
0.070∗∗∗
(0.016)
–0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
–0.004
(0.007)
–0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
Note:The table reports coefficients, with standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. Number
of observations in panels A and B: 1,895,614 (1,714,974 for KS2) pupils in 1,440 schools. Samples in panels
A and B include observations up to 2012–13 for academies opened in 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2012–13 in
the time window [c–6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2012–13 for
academies that will open in 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16 in the time window [c–6, c–1] (control group).
Number of observations in panel C: 333,903 (322,788 for KS2) pupils in 303 schools. Sample in panel
C includes observations up to 2009–10 for academies opened between 2002–03 and 2009–10 in the time
window [c–6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2009–10 for sponsored
academies that will open in 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2012–13 in the time window [c–6, c–1] (control group).
KS2 is calculated over English, maths and science. ∗ significant at 10 per cent level; ∗∗ significant at 5 per
cent level; ∗∗∗ significant at 1 per cent level or better.
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and that we are considering the school where pupils start their secondary
education. Our findings therefore suggest that coalition academies slightly
improve their composition in terms of students’ ability by approximately 1
per cent of a standard deviation. Column 2 shows that after conversion, the
coalition-period academies also attract pupils who are less likely to be eligible
for FSM. This effect is precisely estimated and corresponds to approximately
a 4 per cent reduction in the probability that an FSM-eligible pupil is enrolled
at an academy. Lastly, columns 3 and 4 show that academies do not change
their composition in terms of gender, and change it only marginally in terms
of ethnic background, after conversion. The negative conversion effect on the
probability that a white British student is enrolled in the school is borderline
significant and only represents a 0.5 per cent reduction.
In panel B, we shed some light on the time profile of these effects. To do
so, we estimate the model laid out in equation 4 in Section III.3. Column 1
shows a positive and significant effect on pupils’ KS2 attainment two years
after conversion (at 7.7 per cent of a standard deviation). However, we find
almost no effect at the time of conversion (0.006) and a small but insignificant
effect one year after (at 0.019). It is interesting to note that the coefficients on
the years leading up to the time of conversion are small and insignificant (with
the exception of c–5), suggesting that actual academies – the treated group
– are balanced in terms of their pupils’ ability relative to future academies
– the control schools – before they switch. This lends some support to our
identifying strategy, which assumes that the timing of conversion is ‘as good
as random’ within the subset of schools we have chosen for our analysis (see
Section III.3 for a discussion). Column 2 reveals that the average effect of
conversion on FSM-eligible pupils found in panel A comes from the estimate
of the impact in the year after the one in which the academy opened (c+1).
Conversely, the impact at time c is still negative, but small and less precisely
estimated (–0.010), while the impact at time c+2 is essentially zero. Once
again, we find no evidence of differential pre-trends between treated (actual
academies) and controls (future academies), lending support to our approach.
Finally, columns 3 and 4 confirm that academies do not significantly change
the gender and ethnic compositions of their students.
How robust are these findings? As discussed in Section III.3, our sample
includes only pupils in schools that convert between 2010–11 and 2012–13 in
a time window going from six years prior to conversion to up to two years
after (treated schools) and pupils in schools that will convert in 2013–14,
2014–15 and 2015–16 from six years to one year prior to conversion (control
schools). This approach was taken to reduce potentially unobservable time-
varying differences between treated and control schools, and to guarantee we
could test for pre-treatment effects using an equal number of (school-year)
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observations for the two groups. However, this approach is not the only one
we have experimented with.26
To begin with, we redefine the control group to include all the observations
on future converters between 2004–05 and 2012–13 (as opposed to between
c–6 and c–1 from conversion – as for our main control group). The school
year 2004–05 was chosen because it corresponds to c–6 for the first batch of
converters (those with conversion year c = 2010–11). Thus we ‘block’ the
beginning of the observation window of the control group to the first school
year of the treated, and consider all periods up to the end of the sample (2012–
13). Next, we deal with possible spillover effects across adjacent cohorts
of converters. To do so, we use only pupils in future converters opening
in 2015–16 to construct a comparison group. Finally, we drop all pupils in
the comparison group of future converters and estimate our effects using the
timing of opening of the actual converters. Reassuringly, all of these alternative
approaches confirm our previous findings.
Before moving on, it is worth commenting on the size of the effects we
have documented and comparing them with the impact of academy conversion
during the Labour years. To do so, panel C of Table 6 considers pupils in
schools that became academies between 2002–03 and 2009–10 (again in a
time window spanning [c–6, c+2] around the time of opening c) and pupils
enrolled at schools that became ‘sponsored’ academies in 2010–11, 2011–
12 and 2012–13 (from six years prior to conversion to 2009–10, before the
election of the coalition government). This approach reproduces the method
we have used to assess the effect of academies on intake during the coalition
years, and uses the Labour-type ‘sponsored’ academies in the coalition period
as controls for the academies of the Labour years. Our results show that Labour
academies significantly change their intake after conversion (reconfirming the
earlier findings of Wilson (2011) and Eyles and Machin (2015)). The effect
on KS2 is precisely estimated and corresponds to a 7 per cent of a standard
deviation change, on average, over the three periods post-conversion. This
compareswith a 1 per cent estimated effect for the academies opened during the
coalition period. Further, we find that Labour academies significantly reduced
their intake of pupils eligible for FSM. The estimated effect – at around
7 per cent of the baseline probability – is almost twice as sizeable as the
one we found for the coalition years. Finally, Labour academies also attract
fewer pupils of white British origin, but the effect is 10 times larger than the one
we found for the coalition years and much more significant. We return to these
comparisons below where we investigate the differences between ‘sponsored’
and ‘converter’ academies, as well as chain and stand-alone schools, during
the coalition years.
26Results are not tabulated for brevity. However, they are available in the working paper version of this
paper (Eyles, Machin and Silva, 2015).
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2. Heterogeneous effects on intake
In Table 7, we investigatewhether the effects of conversion during the coalition
years on intake are heterogeneous and depend on whether academies are
‘sponsored’ as opposed to ‘converters’ or on whether they are part of a chain
instead of stand-alone institutions. We focus only on KS2 test scores and
pupils’ eligibility for FSM since these are the variables where we detected the
most significant effects previously.
The first three columns of panel A reveal some evidence of heterogeneity.
Whereas ‘converter’ academies do not experience any change in the ability
of their intake, ‘sponsored’ academies that open during the coalition years
attract students with significantly higher KS2 test scores. The estimated effect
corresponds to 5.3 per cent of a standard deviation, with the difference between
the impact of ‘converter’ and ‘sponsored’ academies being significant. This
pattern suggests that the small effect documented in Table 6 is driven by
‘converters’ and that ‘sponsored’ academies opening after the Academies Act
of 2010 more closely resemble the ‘sponsored’ academies of the Labour period
when it comes to changes in their pupil intake. Columns 4–6 of panel A
focus on pupils’ eligibility for FSM and reveal yet another dimension of
heterogeneity. We now find that ‘converters’ are associated with a reduction in
the share of FSM-eligible pupils and drive the overall negative effect presented
in Table 6. Conversely, ‘sponsored’ academies attract pupils who are more
likely to be eligible for FSM after conversion, with an estimated effect of
approximately 9 per cent. As shown in the last column, the difference between
these two coefficients is significant. This suggests that along this margin, the
‘sponsored’ academies of the Labour period and of the coalition years are not
very comparable.
In panel B, we provide evidence of the effect of chain and stand-alone
academies on intake. The first three columns show that only academies in
chains significantly alter their intakes along the dimension of KS2 scores.
However, this effect is smaller than the one documented in panel A for
‘sponsored’ academies. Similarly, the difference in the effect of conversion
between chain and stand-alone academies is less pronounced than the
difference between ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies. Columns 4–6 show
that stand-alone academies tend to attract pupils that are less likely to be eligible
for FSM. The estimated effect is approximately 5 per cent of the baseline
probability, and the difference between chain and stand-alone academies is
marginally significant. Note that chain academies also tend to attract fewer
FSM-eligible pupils, although the effect is not statistically different from zero
and is significantly smaller than the impact of stand-alone conversions.
Given this heterogeneity, we also investigate whether there are interesting
patterns when we consider conversion type and chain interactions (see
Table A2 in the online appendix). Although the results become somewhat
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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noisier, we still find that ‘sponsored’ academies in the coalition years
experienced significant improvements in the averageKS2 scores of their pupils,
irrespective of whether they are in a chain or stand alone. This is not true
for ‘converters’ of any type. We also confirm the pattern detected in panel
A of Table 7 showing that ‘sponsored’ academies marginally increase their
intake of FSM-eligible pupils. Furthermore, the negative effects we found
for ‘converters’ overall is similar when we consider stand-alone and chain
academies separately.
All in all, these results confirm the conclusions we drew from the analysis
of school-level data: the most interesting dichotomy is the one between
‘converters’ and ‘sponsored’ academies. The patterns of heterogeneity in our
findings lend support to the idea that ‘sponsored’ academies in the coalition
years are partially comparable to the Labour-period ‘sponsored’ academies.
However, the pattern of heterogeneity on the percentage of FSM-eligible pupils
enrolled after conversion suggests that ‘sponsored’ academies of the coalition
period might still be different from the ‘sponsored’ academies of the Labour
years along important dimensions.
3. Further results
We conclude our analysis by studying whether the intake effects documented
in Table 7 vary depending on the political party in control of the local council
and on the percentage of secondary academies in the LA. Our results are
presented in Table 8.
In columns 1–3, we focus on changes in the KS2 attainment of pupils.
Irrespective of the party controlling the local council or the share of academies
in the LA, we still find no evidence that ‘converter’ academies significantly
change the ability of their intake. On the other hand, we find that post-
2010 ‘sponsored’ academies increase their students’ ability, but this effect
is declining in the percentage of secondary schools in the same area. In
LAs with a zero percentage of academies, ‘sponsored’ academies increase
the KS2 of their intake by almost 9 per cent of a standard deviation. This
effect is smaller – at 6.4 per cent – in LAs with the average percentage of
academies within our sample (12.3 per cent), and negligible – at less than
1 per cent – in areas with the highest concentration of academies (40 per
cent or the 90th percentile of the distribution). Although this result should
be interpreted with caution, the pattern suggests that in areas with more
competition from other academies, ‘sponsored’ academies might find it hard
to cherry-pick their students or to entice parents of better-achieving pupils
to apply to join the school. Interestingly, we find no heterogeneity in intake
effects when we consider differences between schools in areas with different
political affiliations.
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Columns 4–6 consider whether there is heterogeneity in the effect of
conversion on the admission of FSM-eligible pupils. In this case, we find
no evidence that ‘sponsored’ academies markedly change their intake. Both
the main effect and an interaction with the percentage of academies in the LA
are insignificant and small. The patterns are consistent with those presented
in panel A of Table 7. The evidence for ‘converter’ academies is instead
starker. Following conversion, these experience a reduction in the percentage
of FSM-eligible pupils among their intake, of approximately 8 per cent of
the baseline share of FSM-eligible students in areas with no other academies.
However, this impact is diluted as the percentage of academies in the local
area increases. ‘Converters’ in areas with the average density of secondary
academies experience a decrease in FSM-eligible pupils of approximately
6 per cent, further shrinking to 2 per cent in areas with the top 10 per cent of
academy concentrations. Once again, this suggests that ‘converters’ open in
areas with more competition from other academies might find it hard to attract
better-off parents and admit fewer pupils eligible for FSM.27
VI. Conclusions
The last 15 years have seen radical developments in the English education
landscape. The most salient change in terms of school structures has been
the introduction of academies – autonomous schools that remain part of the
state sector but operate outside the control of the local education authorities.
Academies were first introduced by the Labour government in the early 2000s
as a remedial school improvement intervention aimed at turning around failing
schools. However, the coalition government elected in May 2010 quickly and
dramatically changed the aims of the programme and pushed for an acceleration
of the academisation of state education with the aim of promoting autonomy
and competition and increasing educational standards.
The aim of this paper was to study whether the nature of academies has
changed as a result of this shift. In order to do so, we have investigated and
contrasted the characteristics associated with conversion during the Labour
government years and the coalition government period. We have also studied
how the composition of schools that became academies after 2010 changes as
a result of conversion, and whether the association between academisation and
changes in intake differs across different types of academies and in the Labour
and coalition years.
27In some additional extensions, we studied whether the evidence presented above is heterogeneous for
academies whose predecessor was either a community or voluntary-controlled school (the least autonomous
school types) as opposed to a foundation or voluntary-aided school. We found no evidence of strong
and significant heterogeneous patterns. Furthermore, this additional dimension did not help shed light on
the differences/similarities between the Labour and coalition years, or the ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’
academies. As a consequence, the results are not tabulated (but are available from the authors).
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Our evidence leaves no doubts that the second batch of academies differs
markedly from the first. Schools that converted during the Labour years had
low attainment and a high share of disadvantaged students before conversion.
The opposite is true for schools that became academies after May 2010. We
also find that the new academies tend to experience no changes in terms
of the ability of the students they enrol, and some limited changes in the
percentage of children eligible for free school meals. This is in contrast to
evidence for the Labour academies, which shows significant improvements in
the ability of enrolled students and more substantial declines in the percentage
of disadvantaged pupils after conversion.
Altogether, this suggests that simple extrapolation from the evidence on the
effects of the first batch of conversions to the second batch is not warranted and
is potentially very misleading. This finding is important because extrapolation
has been, and continues to be, commonplace among policymakers, media
commentators and – in some cases – academics. Nevertheless, our results
also point to some commonalities between the two programmes. ‘Sponsored’
academies – originally introduced by Labour but also proliferating during the
coalition period – have fairly similar pre-conversion characteristics during
both regimes. Moreover, they tend to change the ability of their pupil intake
in similar ways across all years, though the change in the percentage of
disadvantaged pupils they attract is somewhat different for the two batches.
This suggests that a comparison of ‘sponsored’ academies in both regimes may
be relatively legitimate and that an extrapolation of the lessons learned for the
Labour academies might apply to a subset of coalition academies. Despite this,
it is important to stress that the academy sector has predominantly expanded
through the ‘converter’ route. Our analysis reveals that there is too little
overlap between the nature of these academies and the Labour batch to warrant
anymeaningful extrapolation. Indeed, the fact that these schools were typically
designated as ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ before conversion means that they may
not see the need to innovate post-conversion in the same way that the poorly
performing ‘sponsored’ academies might.28
More broadly, our paper holds important lessons for the debate about
the consequences of autonomy in state education. The revamped academy
programme launched in May 2010 is an experiment of unprecedented scale in
which highly performing schools – as well as struggling schools – are allowed
more independencewith the hope that thiswill bring improvements in standards
across the board. In the span of six years, these autonomous institutions have
gone from being a minor part of the education system to representing more
than 60 per cent of secondary and more than 20 per cent of primary schools.
One of the main concerns with such a vast expansion of autonomy and
differentiation in education has been the risk of increased stratification,
28Academies Commission, 2013.
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with students of different backgrounds segregated in different schools,
either because of differential parental preferences for different types of
schools or because of school admission practices. Our analysis reveals that
these concerns are partly warranted. Intake composition in terms of pupils’
academic ability clearly improved more for the Labour academies than for the
coalition academies. Nevertheless, we also found that ‘converter’ academies
enrol fewer pupils eligible for free school meals. Conversely, the intake of
coalition ‘sponsored’ academies has become somewhat more skewed towards
disadvantaged children. This suggests that, at least along this dimension,
schools are becoming more stratified.
Although we are not yet able to tell whether this stems from parental free
choice or school ‘back door’ (hidden) selection practices, understanding the
mechanisms that lie behind this finding is an essential future research venture
of relevance for designing policies that can help reap the potential benefits of
more autonomous schooling, while at the same time mitigating any negative
effects.
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